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Colin Koopman, Pragmatism as Transition: Historicity and Hope in James, Dewey, and 
Rorty (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), ISBN: 978-0231148740 
 
Pragmatism as Transition calls for an Aufhebung of previous paradigms in classical American 
thought.  Koopman’s “transitionalist pragmatism moves beyond both lingustic pragmatism 
and experiential pragmatism in a way that preserves the best insights of each.” (179-180) 
Therefore, it seeks both a critique and a renewal of pragmatist thought; in other words, 
Koopman calls for a reconstruction of pragmatism along genealogical lines.  Linguistic prag-
matism is represented by Neopragmatists such as Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, and Jürgen 
Habermas (those who have made the vaunted linguistic turn), while the experience paradigm 
governs the thought of the original pragmatists, especially James and Dewey, understood as 
defenders of experiential pragmatism, with Rorty understood as primary defender of the 
linguistic variety (though Koopman mentions Peirce, Emerson, and Thoreau, they are not the 
focus of his study). 
 
While this may be a worthy project, it would seem to have little to do with the work of Michel 
Foucault save for the fact that Koopman’s transitionalist pragmatism provides for a big tent 
pragmatism, one that includes the likes of Bernard Williams (whose reservations with regard 
to Rorty’s work are perhaps too quickly dismissed), as well as Pierre Bourdieu and Hans-
Georg Gadamer, and, yes, Michel Foucault.  We discover at the conclusion of the book that 
Foucault and Dewey need each other, or at least genealogy and pragmatism need to supple-
ment one another.  I will return to the question of whether such co-dependence is a good thing 
in my conclusion.  In the meantime, I will briefly sketch Koopman’s argument before turning 
to his treatment of Foucault’s genealogy understood under the rubric of Transitionalist Prag-
matism.  Transitionalist Pragmatism can best be understood as “meliorist cultural criticism,” 
that is, the various concrete ways that “philosophy can help us improve those situations in 
which we find ourselves.” (5)  I am not altogether certain that Foucault was on board for such 
a Deweyean-Rortyean program.  Furthermore, this book is sure to disappoint those readers of 
Foucault’s work who are not interested in Classical American Philosophy, as Foucault does 
not figure prominently in the text (indeed, his work is not discussed until the final fifteen 
pages of the book, although Koopman lists a forthcoming study on Foucault’s genealogical 
method that promises to develop the work begun here).  That said, for readers interested in 
American philosophy, Koopman presents a worthy reconstruction of pragmatist themes.   
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The experiential paradigm characterized the work of the classical pragmatists.  Upon this 
view, experience becomes a primitive term, so the task of the pragmatist philosopher is to 
make sense of it.  The problem as Koopman sees it (and he’s certainly not alone here) is that 
this term comes to serve as something more than a beginning point for philosophical inquiry 
by becoming an inescapable metaphysical foundation, what Dewey decries as an inescapable 
quest for certainty.  More specifically, the problems with experience lie in what Koopman 
terms “the high modern triumvirate of givenism, representationalism, and foundationalism.” 
(186)  Proponents of the linguistic paradigm begin by pointing out the problems with these 
three bugbears, and propose the mediation of language as an antidote (think for example of 
Rorty’s anti-foundationalist work in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature or Sellars’ arguments 
against the myth of the given).  Koopman argues that the linguistic cure proposed by its pro-
ponents is at least as bad as the disease of givenism.      
 
While Rorty and other neopragmatists do away with the myth of the given, in rendering 
experience language all they way down they neglect the realm of practices.  It was no accident 
that Rorty was fond of Gadamer’s line “Being that can be understood is language” (cited by 
Koopman, 122), nor was it happenstance that the linguistic turn shared much with the 
hermeneutic phenomenology of Gadamer: 
 
Gadamer’s argument against foundationalist epistemology, like Rorty’s, took its cue in part 
from Heidegger’s radicalization of the basic hermeneutic situation.  This radicalization con-
sisted in showing that all understanding is historically situated such that temporal finitude 
is taken as a basic context for human understanding.  This perspective enables us to see that 
the foundationalist attempt to ground knowledge in something universal and unchanging is 
not only impossible but also unnecessary: Gadamer, also like Rorty, takes this Heideggerian 
radicalization as resulting in the idea that all understanding is linguistic. (122)   
 
Of course, the problem here is that Rorty comes perilously close to rendering language 
another sort of foundation, similar to the role that experience played in the work of the 
classico-pragmatists.  At the very least, defenders of the linguistic paradigm exclude other 
types of experience with little good reason.  Koopman’s transitionalist pragmatism will effect a 
return to experience, but not experience understood as an origin.  Experience should be under-
stood as multivalent, rather than the singular origin of experience.  Inquiry occurs within ex-
perience, but not as a result of it.  I suspect that on this point Koopman may be accused of 
setting up the classical pragmatist as a Rorty-inspired straw man.  Certainly Dewey scholars 
will protest that Dewey conceived experience along non-foundationalist lines, and not without 
some justification.  Another possible line of objection will likely come from Peirceans who ar-
gue that non-foundationalist realism is a live possibility.  Koopman has cleverly framed his 
discussion in terms of reconstruction, which allows him to simultaneously critique and extend 
the analyses of predecessors such as Dewey, Rorty, and Peirce.         
 
Although I have focussed thus far on the epistemological issues at stake in Pragmatism as Tran-
sition, Koopman presents transitional pragmatism as a tonic to cure the ills that befall pragma-
tists working in ethics and political philosophy as well.  Transitionalist pragmatism manifests 
Foucault Studies, No. 10, pp. 178-181. 
 
180 
 
itself in ethics as Stanley Cavell-inspired perfectionism.  This serves as a way through the im-
passe posed by modern moral philosophy, with utilitarians on one side and Kantians on the 
other.  But the problem is that deontology and consequentialism need one another—they’re 
incomplete: 
 
Cavell says that he does not “coceive of *perfectionism+ as an alternative to Kantianism or 
Utilitarianism.”  Rather, perfectionism makes room for, and stimulates us to, both teleology 
[Koopman unaccountably labels what most ethical theorists understand as consequen-
tialism as teleology, but this conflates virtue-based ethical theories with consequentialist 
ones] and deontology, but without insisting that one of these approaches exclude the other.  
[...] The idea is simply that teleology and deontology do not by themselves capture every-
thing of ethical importance. (146)  
  
Cavell’s perfectionist ethics focuses on transformation rather than present or past conditions.  
It is an open project of perfecting that is in principle without end.  There are interesting 
parallels between Foucault’s ethical project and Cavell’s, but Koopman does not pursue them 
here. 
 
In political philosophy, pragmatists generally seek a middle way between appeals to tradition 
found among conservatives and the revolutionay praxis characteristic of the Left.  “The prag-
matist and the conservative draw two quite different lessons in their respective afirmations of 
reformism as potentially radical and necessarily conservative.  The conservative urges that we 
ought not to engage in too much purposive political change (in the name of ethical ideals, for 
instance) lest we interfere with the invisible hand set in motion by the transparent cunning of 
reason.  The pragmatist urges by contrast that an evolutionist conception of poitical reason 
shows us precisely the terrain on which ethical interventions into political realities ought to be 
situated: within the domain of political reality itself.” (164)  Such a middle way goes by the 
name of meliorism.  In other words, the pragmatist seeks out concrete solutions for concrete 
problems.  Indeed, if one were so crass as to reduce Koopman’s interesting book to a bumper 
sticker slogan, that would be it.  And here is where Dewey needs Foucault.  Koopman argues 
that the problem with Dewey’s conception of meliorism is that it is short on concreteness 
when it comes to problems.  Dewey is fine with solutions, but vague when it comes to descrip-
tion of the various problems that arise in the course of individual and social existence.  This is 
where Foucault comes in, for Foucault saves Dewey from conceiving the problematic situation 
as a vague given.  More specifically, Foucault’s genealogies save Dewey’s pragmatism.  
 
From the standpoint of Foucault scholarship, this is unsatisfying for at least two reasons: first 
it reduces Foucault’s thought to a supplement of Dewey’s work.  Regardless of whether this 
was Koopman’s intent, it is the result.  In Koopman’s defense, he never claimed to be writing a 
book on Foucault, but this result limits the effectiveness of Koopman’s work for Foucault 
scholars.  Secondly, in taking up Foucault’s work and focusing on his genealogy, Pragmatism as 
Transition reduces Foucault to his genealogies, which comprise a relatively small group of 
Foucault’s oeuvre.  Furthermore, I am not certain that Foucault’s work can be described as 
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meliorist in any meaningful sense.  While Koopman’s book is well-written and valuable for 
students of American pragmatism, it is unfortunately of little value for Foucault scholars.   
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